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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Sofia Vergara and her ex-fiancé, Nick Loeb, created and stored 
several pre-embryos with the intention of using them to start a fami-
ly together. Since then, the two have separated and now dispute the 
fate of the pre-embryos they created. Should the pre-embryos be con-
sidered persons, property, or something else? Should they be afforded 
the right to life because one party wants them to develop or should 
they be discarded because one party no longer wants to procreate? 
Who should decide? The lack of regulation in the area of assisted re-
productive technology leaves these sensitive disputes in the hands of 
courts and raises many questions. This Note will provide an answer.   
 In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a process typically used by couples1 
trying to overcome infertility.2 The IVF process involves the fertiliza-
                                                                                                                                       
 * J.D. 2015, cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to 
thank my parents, Phil and Esperanza Steinmiller, for loving and supporting me; and  
Professor Mary Ziegler for challenging me to think about the legal implications of assisted 
reproductive technology and guiding me through the writing process. 
 1. The use of the term “couples” is not meant to create a distinction regarding sexual 
orientation or marital status of the parties.  
 2. Melissa Conrad Stöppler, In Vitro Fertilization, EMEDICINEHEALTH, 
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/in_vitro_fertilization/article_em.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2016). Infertility is the inability of a couple to become pregnant after one year of unprotect-
ed sex without using birth control methods. Id. Infertility affects nearly 6.1 million people 
in the United States, yet less than five percent of infertile couples utilize IVF treatment. 
Id. 
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tion of a woman’s eggs by a man’s sperm in a laboratory to create a 
pre-embryo.3 Once a pre-embryo is created, it is implanted into the 
uterus of either the genetic mother or a surrogate in hopes of achiev-
ing pregnancy and childbirth.4 Couples are typically advised to ferti-
lize multiple pre-embryos and implant several pre-embryos into the 
woman’s uterus at one time to increase chances of pregnancy.5 Many 
couples choose to cryogenically preserve the remaining pre-embryos 
they produce.6 Cryogenic preservation involves freezing and storing 
pre-embryos for future use. These frozen pre-embryos may be thawed 
and transferred into a woman’s uterus to develop, donated to another 
infertile couple, discarded, implanted when pregnancy is unlikely, 
donated for research, or kept frozen indefinitely.7 Deciding to freeze 
pre-embryos may provide several benefits to a couple seeking to pro-
create, such as reducing the cost of undergoing additional procedures 
to extract eggs, increasing the likelihood of achieving childbirth by 
making pre-embryos available for implantation at a later time, or 
allowing a couple to postpone procreation until they are ready to 
have children.8 However, the option of freezing pre-embryos opens 
the door for couples’ circumstances to change by, for example, hav-
ing their desired child and not needing to utilize the remaining pre- 
                                                                                                                                       
 3. Id. The egg and sperm create a one-cell zygote, which undergoes successive equal 
divisions until it is composed of eight cells. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 
1992). “While this entity is not technically an embryo because it has not been permitted to 
develop beyond an eight-cell entity, the majority of courts and scholars refer to these cells 
as preembryos.” Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination of the Reso-
lution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
395, 395 n.4 (2005) (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594).  
 4. Stöppler, supra note 2. 
 5. Nivin Todd, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/ 
infertility-and-reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization?page=2 (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
According to a 2009 report by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on IVF 
in the United States: “Pregnancy was achieved in an average of 29.4% of all cycles (higher 
or lower depending on the age of the woman),” and “[t]he percentage of cycles that resulted 
in live births was 22.4% on average (higher or lower depending on the age of the woman).” 
Id. According to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), in 2012 the per-
centage of cycles resulting in pregnancies in women under 35 years of age was 46.7%, and 
the percentage of cycles resulting in live births was 40.7%. Clinic Summary Report, SART, 
https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016). 
 6. David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their 
Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1063 (2003).  
 7. See Amy Demma, How Do I Make a Decision About My Remaining Embryos? What 
Are My Options?, RESOLVE FOR THE JOURNEY & BEYOND (2013), http://www.resolve.org/ 
family-building-options/donor-options/how-do-i-make-a-decision-about-my-remaining-
embryos.html; Todd, supra note 5. 
 8. See Fotini Antonia Skouvakis, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests Ap-
proach to Decide the Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 885, 886, 888 (2005); Todd, supra note 5. 
2015]  PERSONHOOD FOR PRE-EMBRYOS 317 
 
embryos or no longer wishing to pursue procreation.9 This lapse of 
time gives rise to litigation regarding the treatment and disposition 
of pre-embryos. 
 Since IVF was introduced in the United States in 1981,10 there 
have been a handful of cases responsible for developing precedent to 
guide disputes over pre-embryos. These cases have attempted to 
characterize the legal status of pre-embryos as persons, property, or 
human tissue deserving “special respect.”11 The legal status deter-
mines the decision-making authority of the parties, IVF providers, 
and courts over the pre-embryos, as well as the options for dispute 
resolution.12 To resolve these pre-embryo disputes courts have adopt-
ed conflicting methods, including enforcing contracts, choosing not to 
enforce prior agreements in favor of contemporaneous mutual 
agreement, or balancing the parties’ respective interests.13 There is 
no consensus among jurisdictions regarding a preferred standard; 
thus, courts have been free to select from a patchwork of models in 
order to resolve cases.  
 The discontinuity regarding the legal status of pre-embryos and 
models for dispute resolution is further complicated by the risks that 
accompany developing IVF technology.14 Accordingly, this is an area 
                                                                                                                                       
 9. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998). 
 10. Todd, supra note 5. 
 11. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); Skouvakis, supra note 8, at 887.  
 12. Upchurch, supra note 3, at 396.  
 13. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776-79 (Iowa 2003) (describing the 
three methods of analysis courts have suggested to resolve disputes over pre-embryos).  
 14. The practice of implanting numerous pre-embryos can lead to a higher rate of 
multiple births, which may increase health risks for the mother and the baby. Todd, supra 
note 5. According to the SART, as of 2012 the percentage of live births involving multiple 
children in women under thirty-five years of age was 30.6%. Clinic Summary Report, supra 
note 5. WebMD reports that 63% of live births are single babies, and 37% are twins, tri-
plets, or more. Stöppler, supra note 2. Multiple births may result in a higher risk of mis-
carriage, anemia, hemorrhaging, and early labor, as well as the birth of weaker, under-
weight babies. Daily Mail Reporter, IVF Couples Told Mothers and Babies Put at  
Risk from Multiple Embryo Implant, DAILYMAIL.COM (May 13, 2011, 7:03), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1386622/IVF-couples-warned-aiming-twins-puts-
mother-babies-risk.html.  
Aside from risks associated with childbirth, the IVF procedure can be strenuous for 
women. The process involves daily injections of hormones to stimulate production of multi-
ple eggs, as well as frequent blood tests, and transvaginal ultrasounds. Stöppler, supra 
note 2. After stimulation, the eggs are removed by insertion of a needle through the wom-
an’s vagina into the ovary. Id. Three to five days later, the woman must undergo a proce-
dure to transfer the fertilized pre-embryo to her uterus through the cervix with a catheter. 
Id. After the transfer, the woman must continue to take hormone injections. Id. Moreover, 
risks of the surgical procedure may include damage to organs, and injections may cause 
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS). Id.  
Furthermore, this process is prohibitively expensive. According to the American Society 
of Reproductive Medicine, the average cost of a cycle in the United States is $12,400. Todd, 
supra note 5. The average cost of IVF treatment resulting in the live birth of a child is 
$41,132. Georgina M. Chambers et al., The Economic Impact of Assisted Reproductive 
318  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:315 
 
of law that warrants regulation. Government regulation of the legal 
status of pre-embryos, the contracts between parties and IVF provid-
ers, and the extent to which IVF may be used by parties seeking  
to procreate would promote continuity and respect for life. Couples 
entering into this process would benefit from clarity concerning pa-
rental responsibilities and predictability regarding dispute resolu-
tion;15 and resulting pre-embryos would benefit from the opportunity  
to develop. 
 Currently, Florida law has not settled on a legal status for pre-
embryos or determined a model for resolving disputes between par-
ties about frozen, stored pre-embryos. The divergent methods that 
have been applied in different jurisdictions lead to unsatisfactory 
resolutions and call for legislative action. This Note will present a 
framework for Florida, or any state, to adopt regarding the treatment 
of pre-embryos in IVF. Part II will summarize the relevant cases and 
various methods courts have applied in order to resolve pre-embryo 
disputes. Additionally, Part II will consider legislation enacted by 
other states and countries. Part III will address the problems that 
arise with the current treatment of pre-embryos in disputed cases. 
Part IV will advocate for Florida to enact legislation that treats a 
pre-embryo as a life16 that should be accorded personhood rights. Part 
IV will also establish the authority of Florida to regulate in the area 
of IVF and propose legislation that would provide a favorable frame-
work to resolve disputes. Part V will establish that personhood for 
pre-embryos would not infringe on individuals’ reproductive rights 
and would not conflict with current precedent, while addressing like-
ly objections to the proposed framework. Part VI will conclude that 
Florida should recognize personhood for pre-embryos to facilitate dis-
pute resolution and to respect life.  
II.   CURRENT TREATMENT OF PRE-EMBRYOS 
 Some courts, state legislatures, and foreign lawmakers have al-
ready addressed the treatment of pre-embryos in assisted reproduc-
tion disputes. Some courts have taken a position on what legal status 
should be accorded to pre-embryos, while others have glossed over 
any specific articulation of a legal status and simply considered the 
progenitors’ rights. Some states and countries have enacted legisla-
tion to guide parties entering into IVF, while most others have not 
                                                                                                                                       
Technology: A Review of Selected Developed Countries, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2281, 
2291 (2009).  
 15. See Upchurch, supra note 3, at 397.  
 16. Throughout this Note, the pre-embryo may be referred to as “potential life” or a 
“life.” Both terms refer to the pre-embryos at issue; however, while most courts denote the 
pre-embryo as a “potential life,” I will refer to the pre-embryo as a “life” where my view  
is expressed.  
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legislated on the issue. There has not been a consensus regarding the 
treatment of pre-embryos by the majority of courts and governments. 
This Part will summarize the major cases that have dealt with pre-
embryo disputes, the different frameworks courts have employed, 
and laws of several states and foreign countries that govern the 
treatment of pre-embryos.  
A.   First Impression for Treatment of Pre-Embryos 
 The first case to resolve a dispute over pre-embryos was York v. 
Jones in 1989. In this case, a couple sought to have their frozen pre-
embryos transferred from a medical college in Virginia to California, 
and it was disputed whether the couple retained control of their pre-
embryos.17 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
regarded the issue as a property dispute and resolved this case based 
on the bailor-bailee relationship between the Yorks and the medical 
college.18 The court considered that “[t]he essential nature of a bail-
ment relationship imposes on the bailee, when the purpose of the 
bailment has terminated, an absolute obligation to return the subject 
matter of the bailment to the bailor,”19 which would require the medi-
cal college to release the pre-embryos to the Yorks. Thus, they were 
able to transfer the pre-embryos to another institute for the purpose 
of pursuing pregnancy.20 
 The court in York took for granted the status of the pre-embryo as 
property, so the court did not present potential frameworks or ana-
lyze competing legal interests in the resolution of this dispute. This 
case was also distinct from most pre-embryo cases, which involve 
disputes between couples over disposition of the pre-embryos they 
have jointly created. The first case to consider such a dispute and ar-
ticulate a standard to provide guidance for future courts in resolving 
pre-embryo disputes was Davis v. Davis in 1992.  
 Davis involved a dispute between Mary Sue Davis and Junior  
Davis over the disposition of seven frozen pre-embryos following the 
couple’s divorce.21 The couple had trouble bringing a child to term 
and, after pursuing adoption without success, began the process of 
IVF.22 Mary Sue underwent several unsuccessful IVF procedures to 
transfer pre-embryos into her uterus.23 The couple then decided to 
cryogenically preserve the pre-embryos but did not make an agree-
                                                                                                                                       
 17. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 18. Id. at 425. 
 19. Id. (citing 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 178 (1980)). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).  
 22. Id. at 591. 
 23. Id.  
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ment about storage or disposition of the frozen pre-embryos in the 
event of “contingencies.”24 The lack of foresight about contingencies 
was precisely the issue in this case. Following the couple’s divorce, 
Mary Sue still wanted to implant the pre-embryos to bear children, 
but Junior preferred to leave them frozen until he decided whether or 
not he wished to become a parent.25  
 There was a dispute in the trial court regarding the semantics of 
the pre-embryos at issue.26 Because this was a case of first impres-
sion, there was no guidance for the court in determining how the pre-
embryos should be treated, or what terminology was appropriate. 
“[S]emantical distinctions are significant in this context, because 
language defines legal status and can limit legal rights.”27 Ultimate-
ly, the trial court held that “human life begins at the moment of con-
ception” and invoked the doctrine of parens patriae to find for the 
best interest of the child and award custody of the pre-embryos to 
Mary Sue.28  
 The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that awarding 
custody to Mary Sue would violate Junior’s constitutional right not to 
procreate and that “there [was] no compelling state interest to justify 
[ ] ordering implantation against the will of either party.”29 The ap-
pellate court remanded for the trial court to resolve this case under 
the view that the parties had joint control over the disposition.30  
 The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case to give more 
guidance on this developing area of law. By this point, the parties’ 
views had changed; Mary Sue sought to donate the pre-embryos to 
another couple, while Junior wanted to discard them.31 The court de-
clared that there was no statute or common law precedent to guide 
the decision and presented various models that medical-legal schol-
ars and ethicists proposed regarding the treatment of pre-embryos:  
Those models range from a rule requiring, at one extreme, that all 
embryos be used by the gamete-providers or donated for uterine 
transfer, and, at the other extreme, that any unused embryos be 
automatically discarded. Other formulations would vest control in 
the female gamete-provider—in every case, because of her greater 
physical and emotional contribution to the IVF process, or perhaps 
only in the event that she wishes to use them herself. There are  
also two “implied contract” models: one would infer from enroll-
                                                                                                                                       
 24. Id. at 592. 
 25. Id. at 589. 
 26. Id. at 592-93.  
 27. Id. at 592. 
 28. Id. at 594. 
 29. Id. at 589 (second alteration in original).  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 590. 
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ment in an IVF program that the IVF clinic has authority to decide 
in the event of an impasse whether to donate, discard, or use the 
“frozen embryos” for research; the other would infer from the par-
ties’ participation in the creation of the embryos that they had 
made an irrevocable commitment to reproduction and would  
require transfer either to the female provider or to a donee. There 
are also the so-called “equity models”: one would avoid the conflict 
altogether by dividing the “frozen embryos” equally between the 
parties, to do with as they wish; the other would award veto power 
to the party wishing to avoid parenthood, whether it be the female 
or the male progenitor.32 
 The court conceded that each of these models would provide a 
bright-line rule, but it declined to adopt any.33 The court then dis-
cussed the legal status of the pre-embryo, noting that the status dic-
tates the decision-making authority of the parties, and the scope of 
the decision-making authority is crucial to how courts will resolve 
these cases.34 The court considered three ethical positions set out by 
the American Fertility Society. The first view asserted that the pre-
embryo is a human being at the time of fertilization and should be 
accorded rights of a person.35 Under this view, all pre-embryos would 
have the opportunity for implantation and development, and any ac-
tion that would harm the pre-embryo would be prohibited.36 The sec-
ond view asserted that the pre-embryo is nothing more than human 
tissue and should not receive protection from any action.37 The third 
view asserted that the pre-embryo deserves special respect because of 
its potential for human life, while recognizing that the pre-embryo is 
not yet a fully formed individual warranting the protection of per-
sonhood.38 The court rejected both extremes, refusing to recognize 
personhood or give the pre-embryo a property status.39 Thus, the 
court concluded that pre-embryos “occupy an interim category that 
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human 
life.”40 Based on this status, both Mary Sue and Junior had decision-
making authority regarding the disposition of the pre-embryos.  
 The court then set up a framework for resolving pre-embryo dis-
putes. First, the court would presume valid and enforce any agree-
ment regarding disposition of pre-embryos in the event of contingen-
                                                                                                                                       
 32. Id. at 590-91 (footnotes omitted). 
 33. Id. at 591. 
 34. Id. at 597. 
 35. Id. at 596. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 597. 
 40. Id. 
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cies such as death of either or both parties, divorce, changes in finan-
cial situation, or abandonment of IVF altogether.41 However, the par-
ties would retain the ultimate decision-making authority and be able 
to modify initial agreements with mutual consent.42 If the parties 
could not agree on modification, the initial agreement would be en-
forced.43 If there was no prior agreement, the court would balance the 
parties’ interests, weighing the interests of the parties in seeking 
procreation or avoiding procreation.44 Under this balancing test, 
courts would place greater weight on the rights of the party wishing 
to avoid procreation so long as the other party had alternate means of 
achieving parenthood.45  
 In this case, since there was no agreement concerning disposition, 
and the parties were at an impasse, the court balanced Junior’s right 
to avoid procreation and Mary Sue’s right to procreate.46 The court 
held that the burden on Junior—of unwanted fatherhood or having 
his pre-embryos develop into children and potentially grow up in a 
single-parent home—was greater than the burden on Mary Sue—of 
having undergone invasive IVF procedures and losing the opportuni-
ty to have her pre-embryos develop into children for another couple.47 
B.   Major Cases and Mixed Models 
 Since Davis, many courts have used the decision as a starting 
point for their analyses in resolving pre-embryo disputes. However, 
most cases have included prior agreements between the parties,  
unlike Davis, and thus the courts have focused more on the enforcea-
bility of pre-embryo agreements. In cases involving such prior 
agreements, courts have either enforced them or refused to enforce 
them, often in favor of the party wishing to avoid procreation. Addi-
tionally, many courts have not characterized the legal status of the 
pre-embryos, choosing to defer to the status set out by any IVF 
agreement or declaring that the status does not have much of an  
effect on the parties’ decision-making authority over the pre-embryos. 
Moreover, courts have commonly weighed the parties’ respective  
                                                                                                                                       
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 603. On a rare occasion, in Reber v. Reiss, this framework led to an outcome 
in favor of the party seeking procreation. 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). In Reber, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania granted the ex-wife possession of the pre-embryos. Id. at 
1142. The court considered that she endured chemotherapy for breast cancer and that she 
believed she was incapable of having children. Id. at 1132-34. Thus, the court concluded 
that under the balancing test her right to procreate outweighed the ex-husband’s right to 
avoid procreation. Id. at 1142.  
 46. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.  
 47. Id. at 604.  
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interests even where there was a prior agreement, contrary to  
what Davis suggests. By doing so, the majority of courts have ruled 
in favor of the party wishing to avoid procreation, regardless of the 
model adopted.  
 1.   Enforcing Prior Agreements 
 In Kass v. Kass, an issue arose before the New York Court of Ap-
peals involving the disposition of five frozen pre-embryos of a di-
vorced couple.48 Unlike in Davis, this couple had entered into a con-
tract at the outset of the IVF process.49 The Kass couple agreed that 
upon divorce or other contingency the pre-embryos would be donated 
to the IVF program for research purposes.50 The agreement specified 
that legal ownership of the pre-embryos was to be determined in a 
property settlement in the event of a dispute.51 When the couple di-
vorced, the ex-wife wished to have the pre-embryos implanted to 
achieve pregnancy,52 while the ex-husband sought specific perfor-
mance of the agreement.53 The court expressed that it had no cause to 
decide whether the pre-embryos deserved special respect, as the Da-
vis court did, because the parties’ authority over the pre-embryos was 
established by the agreement.54 Following the Davis framework as 
applied to contract enforcement, the court held that the agreement 
signed by the parties plainly reflected their joint intention to donate 
the pre-embryos to the IVF program and should be enforced.55  
 Similarly, in Roman v. Roman, the Texas Court of Appeals applied 
the Davis framework to enforce a prior agreement between a couple 
which provided for the pre-embryos to be discarded in the event of 
divorce.56 The court did not independently analyze the status of the 
pre-embryos but accepted the status conferred by the contract that 
identified them as the joint property of the couple.57 The court rea-
soned that written embryo agreements are valid and enforceable so 
long as the parties have the opportunity to withdraw consent to the 
terms of the agreement.58 
                                                                                                                                       
 48. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).  
 49. Id. at 175. 
 50. Id. at 177. 
 51. Id. at 176. 
 52. Id. at 175.  
 53. Id. at 177. 
 54. Id. at 180.  
 55. Id. at 175. 
 56. 193 S.W.3d 40, 54-55 (Tex. App. 2006).  
 57. Id. at 51.  
 58. Id. at 48.  
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 In Litowitz v. Litowitz, the parties were required to petition the 
court for instructions about the disposition of the pre-embryos when 
they could not reach an agreement.59 The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton enforced the cryopreservation contract providing that the pre-
embryos be thawed out and not allowed to develop.60 In this case, the 
court enforced the contract over the objection of both parties, who 
each sought procreation; the ex-husband wished to donate the pre-
embryos to an adoptive couple, and the ex-wife sought to implant 
them in a surrogate.61  
 Finally, in Szafranski v. Dunston, the Illinois Court of Appeals 
considered the various approaches available for a dispute over pre-
embryos between a girlfriend and boyfriend.62 The court held that the 
best approach was to honor the parties’ own mutually expressed  
intent in a prior agreement as valid and binding.63 The court stated 
that, had it decided to balance the parties’ interests, the outcome 
would have been in favor of the girlfriend because she had no alter-
nate means of conceiving a child due to chemotherapy.64 It dually 
noted that, had it adopted the contemporaneous mutual consent  
approach, the case would have come out in favor of the boyfriend  
because he would have withheld consent to implantation of the pre-
embryos.65 Thus, Szafranski is another rare case in which the party 
seeking to procreate prevailed.66 
 2.   Refusing to Enforce Agreements 
 In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts  
declined to enforce a consent form wherein a couple mutually agreed 
that the remaining frozen pre-embryos should be returned to the ex-
wife for implantation in the event of separation.67 The court consid-
ered that Davis and Kass presumed prior agreements to be valid and 
enforceable, but it reasoned that the consent form did not express the 
mutual intention of the parties regarding disposition and thus was 
not an enforceable contract.68 Moreover, the court declared that even 
if the couple entered into an unambiguous pre-embryo agreement, it 
would not enforce the contract against the will of either party for 
                                                                                                                                       
 59. 48 P.3d 261, 264 (Wash. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 268. 
 61. Id. at 264. 
 62. 993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).  
 63. Id.  
 64. See id. at 505-06, 514. 
 65. Id. at 514. 
 66. Id. at 504.  
 67. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 1059 (Mass. 2000). 
 68. Id. at 1055-56.  
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public policy reasons.69 The court did not consider the legal status of 
the pre-embryo but rested the decision on the parties’ rights to enter 
into familial relationships.70 
 Similarly, in J.B. v. M.B., the Supreme Court of New Jersey re-
fused to enforce both an oral agreement between the parties regard-
ing disposition of pre-embryos, as well as the consent form signed by 
the parties.71 The ex-husband claimed that the parties discussed and 
agreed that the pre-embryos would be utilized by them or another 
infertile couple, consistent with his religious views; however, the ex-
wife denied that such an agreement existed.72 The court ruled in her 
favor based on her interest to avoid procreation and held that a “for-
mal, unambiguous memorialization of the parties’ intentions would 
be required to confirm their joint determination.”73 The consent form 
relinquished the pre-embryos to the IVF program if dissolution of 
marriage occurred, but the form was found to be too ambiguous to 
manifest mutual intent about disposition.74 The court declared that 
agreements entered into at the commencement of IVF should be  
enforced, subject to either party changing his or her mind about dis-
position, and if there is disagreement about disposition, the interests 
of both parties must be evaluated.75  
 Finally, in In re Marriage of Witten, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
considered whether the parties’ agreement was enforceable where 
one party changed his or her mind.76 Initially, the court analyzed 
whether pre-embryos had the legal status of children for purposes  
of applying a best interest of the child standard.77 The court held that 
the standard did not fit this case because the issue was not the  
custody of children, but rather who had decision-making authority 
over the pre-embryos.78 This court, like in J.B., held that it would  
be a violation of public policy to enforce an agreement regarding  
disposition of pre-embryos when a party changed his or her mind.79  
Furthermore, public policy concerns about imposing unwanted 
                                                                                                                                       
 69. Id. at 1058.  
 70. Id. at 1059.  
 71. 783 A.2d 707, 714, 719-20 (N.J. 2001). 
 72. Id. at 710. 
 73. Id. at 714. 
 74. Id. at 713. 
 75. Id. at 719. 
 76. 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003).  
 77. Id. at 775.  
 78. Id. at 776 (noting that Davis held that pre-embryos were neither “persons” nor 
“property” for purposes of determining the parties’ decision-making authority about  
disposition).  
 79. Id. at 781. “Only when one person makes known the agreement no longer reflects 
his or her current values or wishes is public policy implicated.” Id. at 783. 
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parenthood would be implicated by the application of the balancing 
approach, which left this emotional, personal decision up to courts.80 
In support of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, the 
court asked, “[A]t what time does the partners’ consent matter?”81 It 
reasoned that under this approach, the parties’ current views should 
replace original agreements because compelled parenthood imposes 
an unwanted identity on a person—forcing them to redefine their 
lives, their place in the world, and their legacy82—while acknowledg-
ing that “mandatory destruction of an embryo can have equally pro-
found consequences, particularly for those who believe that embryos 
are persons . . . [as] loss of a child . . . can lead to life-altering feelings 
of mourning, guilt, and regret.”83 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that when couples cannot reach a contemporaneous mutual agree-
ment, the pre-embryos are to remain frozen.84 
C.   State Legislation Concerning IVF  
 Various jurisdictions have adopted different frameworks for decid-
ing pre-embryo disputes. Most IVF treatments occur at private clin-
ics that usually require a couple seeking IVF to indicate their deci-
sion regarding disposition on the clinic’s informed consent form.85 
However, the cases summarized above demonstrate how states differ 
on the enforcement of such agreements. While many state courts 
have addressed the issue, there has been relatively little state legis-
lation in this area. Some states have enacted legislation addressing 
IVF, but none has answered the question of custody of the pre-
embryos in the event that a couple divorces or cannot reach an 
agreement on disposition.86  
 Florida has enacted legislation requiring that a commissioning 
couple enter into an agreement concerning disposition prior to IVF 
treatment. Section 742.17, Florida Statutes, regarding disposition of 
eggs, sperm, or pre-embryos, provides:  
A commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into 
a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 80. Id. at 779. 
 81. Id. at 777 (citing Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 
91 (1999)). 
 82. Id. at 778 (citing Coleman, supra note 81, at 96-97). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. (citing Coleman, supra note 81, at 110-12). 
 85. Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 81 (2002). 
 86. Id. at 82. 
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commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and preembryos in the event 
of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen  
circumstance. 
(1) Absent a written agreement, any remaining eggs or sperm 
shall remain under the control of the party that provides the eggs 
or sperm. 
(2) Absent a written agreement, decisionmaking authority regard-
ing the disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with the 
commissioning couple. 
(3) Absent a written agreement, in the case of the death of  
one member of the commissioning couple, any eggs, sperm, or 
preembryos shall remain under the control of the surviving mem-
ber of the commissioning couple.87 
 While providing that the pre-embryos remain under the control of 
the parties and that the parties have joint decision-making authority, 
this statute does not recognize a status for pre-embryos. Further-
more, this statute leaves unclear how a case would be resolved if a 
couple failed to reach an agreement about disposition, and it does not 
identify the binding nature of the agreement between the parties.88 
 New Hampshire has enacted legislation regulating gestational 
surrogacy so that a gestational surrogate does not have any rights to 
the child and must agree to carry the child to term.89 New Hampshire 
legislation identifies contingencies, such as divorce, only to say that a 
change of marital status would not have any effect on an agreement 
with a gestational surrogate.90  
 Louisiana is the only state that has enacted strict regulations re-
garding the status of pre-embryos, recognizing them as juridical per-
sons91 with certain rights granted by law.92 Because a pre-embryo is 
considered to be a person under Louisiana law, the State prohibits 
intentional destruction of a pre-embryo by a natural person, physi-
cian, or clinic after the pre-embryo has been allowed to develop for a 
short period wherein the cells begin to divide.93 Furthermore, Louisi-
ana provides that IVF patients seeking treatment owe pre-embryos a 
high duty of care, and if they no longer wish to become parents at 
some point prior to implantation, the pre-embryos should be donated 
                                                                                                                                       
 87. FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2015).  
 88. Shapo, supra note 85, at 82. 
 89. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (2014). 
 90. Id. (“The marriage or partnership of a gestational carrier after she executes a 
gestational carrier agreement does not affect the validity or the terms of the gestational 
carrier agreement, and her spouse or partner shall not be a parent of the resulting child.”). 
 91. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2015). 
 92. § 9:121. 
 93. See § 9:129.  
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to another couple for implantation and adoption.94 Finally, Louisiana 
lawmakers anticipated disputes over custody of pre-embryos and en-
acted legislation requiring courts to resolve cases in the best interest 
of the “in vitro fertilized ovum,”95 a byproduct of the best interest of 
the child standard. 
D.   European Laws Governing IVF 
 Many countries in Europe have regulated IVF to various degrees; 
the United Kingdom, for example, provides loose regulation, while 
other countries criminalize acts that are common in the practice  
of IVF. In the United Kingdom, the primary concern with regard to 
IVF regulation is consent by the parties.96 The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act of 2008 (HFEA) does not prohibit any form of 
destruction or impose any marital status restriction on commission-
ing couples.97 Furthermore, HFEA provides that frozen pre-embryos 
will be discarded ten years after their creation, unless both parties 
consent to continued storage.98  
 France prohibits the creation of pre-embryos for research purposes 
and imposes strict regulations on the use of pre-embryos for re-
search.99 Additionally, France prohibits surrogacy100 and limits IVF 
access to married or committed heterosexual couples for infertility 
treatment.101 The Bioethics Law of 2004 is one of several laws regu-
lating IVF in France.102 It sets out the values of “(i) respect for the 
dignity of the human embryo; (ii) respect for all stages of life; and (iii) 
respect for human rights.”103 However, this law does not include  
specific provisions about the destruction of pre-embryos created for  
IVF purposes.104  
 The German Act on the Protection of Embryos, among other 
things, prohibits fertilizing more than three eggs in one cycle, trans-
                                                                                                                                       
 94. § 9:130.  
 95. § 9:131.  
 96. See Shapo, supra note 85, at 98; Memorandum from White & Case LLP to the 
Center for Reproductive Rights 31 (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.federa.org.pl/ 
dokumenty_pdf/invitro/jbf_European_laws_governing_in_vitro_fertilization%5B2%5D.pdf 
[hereinafter Memorandum]. 
 97. Memorandum, supra note 96, at 33-34. 
 98. Id. at 34. 
 99. Id. at 8. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Id. at 8. IVF is only available if a couple is infertile, if there is a risk of transmit-
ting a disease through natural reproduction, or if a party anticipates medical procedures 
would affect fertility. Id.  
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 104. Id. at 8.  
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ferring more than three pre-embryos to a woman’s uterus per cycle, 
and fertilizing more eggs than are planned to be implanted in one 
cycle.105 German law prohibits creating a pre-embryo for any reason 
other than to cause pregnancy and restricts IVF methods to married 
couples.106 Furthermore, German law generally does not allow for 
cryopreservation of pre-embryos; however, in limited cases where 
surplus pre-embryos are stored, German courts have not decided 
whether destruction of pre-embryos is prohibited by the Act.107 Pun-
ishment for violating restrictions ranges from monetary fines to three 
years in prison.108 
 Italian law is similar to German law in many respects. Italy limits 
the number of pre-embryos that can be created to three, requiring 
contemporaneous implantation, which may reduce the likelihood  
of conception per cycle.109 Additionally, Italy limits IVF access to 
“stable” heterosexual couples.110 Furthermore, it prohibits cryogenic 
preservation, except in limited cases where transfer is delayed  
because of health reasons.111 In such cases, the law provides that  
implantation should occur as soon as possible and imposes monetary 
fines or prison sentences for the violation of any provision.112 Italy 
also grants rights to the pre-embryos as conceived persons.113  
 France, Germany, and Italy provide more stringent regulation to 
promote respect for life at all stages, protect the intentions of the 
parties entering into IVF, and prevent people from utilizing the  
process for reasons other than procreation. The laws ensure that the  
results of IVF procedures match the parties’ intentions when seeking 
treatment. When there is no regulation to support such values,  
problems may arise that are harmful to pre-embryos and individuals 
engaging in IVF. 
III.   PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT TREATMENT OF PRE-EMBRYOS 
 Currently, the law does not offer one answer as to how courts 
should treat pre-embryos, but many. Yet the very nature of IVF 
makes the need for more meaningful regulation apparent. IVF proce-
dures produce many more pre-embryos than a couple intends to use 
                                                                                                                                       
 105. Id. at 11; see Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2008).  
 106. See Memorandum, supra note 96, at 12, 18. 
 107. Id. at 18. 
 108. Id. at 12. 
 109. Id. at 22-23. 
 110. Id. at 23; see Rao, supra note 105, at 1458-59.  
 111. Memorandum, supra note 96, at 22-23.  
 112. Id. at 23-24. 
 113. See id. at 22. 
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for immediate implantation, and excess pre-embryos may be stored 
for an indeterminate amount of time.114 The preservation of pre-
embryos carries the practice of IVF into unknown future circum-
stances, allowing time for parties to change their minds, opinions, 
and desires.115 Regardless of whether couples create agreements that 
anticipate future disposition, the availability of indefinite storage can 
lead to heated litigation when commissioning couples disagree about 
the disposition of the pre-embryos they have created.116  
 The current models for resolution of pre-embryo disputes lead to 
harmful outcomes for various parties involved because litigation 
transfers the decision to have a child to the court. Judicial interfer-
ence is particularly damaging given the deeply moral and personal 
questions at stake in pre-embryo disputes, including individual  
interests in procreating and differing beliefs about when human life 
begins.117 Worse, courts have not adopted a national, uniform stand-
ard for resolving disputes or for understanding the legal status  
of pre-embryos; therefore, people entering into IVF cannot have clear 
expectations regarding their interest in the pre-embryos and the  
result of possible disputes. The trend is for courts to adopt whichever 
model will avoid procreation, so one or both parties are nearly always 
deprived of the right to procreate, and the pre-embryos themselves 
are nearly always deprived of the right to life. 
A.   Lack of Uniformity of Model 
 Inevitably, pre-embryo disputes involve many moving parts:  
deeply emotional and personal decisions that will affect the parties’  
futures, state interests in potential life, rapidly advancing technolo-
gies, and ethical considerations.118 Such factors make it difficult  
for courts to resolve these disputes and lead to the inconsistent  
application of available models to resolve cases. The line of cases 
dealing with pre-embryo disputes has established a set of models  
including the contractual approach, contemporaneous mutual con-
sent, and balancing of interests. As Szafranski indicates, the outcome  
of pre-embryo disputes rests almost entirely on the approach the  
                                                                                                                                       
 114. See Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful 
Choices, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos-egg-
donors-difficult-issues.html?emc=eta1 (“The embryos with the greatest chance of develop-
ing into a healthy baby are used first, and the excess are frozen; a 2002 survey found about 
400,000 frozen embryos, and another in 2011 estimated 612,000. Now, many reproductive 
endocrinologists say, the total may be about a million.”).  
 115. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998). 
 116. See id.  
 117. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003); Davis v. Davis, 
842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992). 
 118. See id. at 591.  
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court adopts, and courts are at liberty to choose which outcome-
determinative approach to apply.119 The variety of approaches and 
divergent positions taken by different jurisdictions leaves little guid-
ance for courts facing similar cases in the future.  
 The lack of uniformity and clarity limits predictability in the  
resolution of disputes. Yet predictability is often necessary to allow 
couples and IVF providers the opportunity to plan for future  
disposition, calculate potential liability, and anticipate the outcome 
of disputes.120 When courts may choose whether to enforce prior 
agreements or to determine the parties’ intentions and balance inter-
ests, parties remain uncertain about which model a court will apply 
in the event of a dispute. This uncertainty may cause people to be 
more hesitant about entering into pre-embryo agreements or to have 
less confidence that their interests will be protected later because 
courts have a tendency to employ whichever approach leads to avoid-
ing procreation, regardless of whether it is consistent with either or 
both of the parties’ interests. For example, the court in Kass deemed 
it appropriate to enforce a prior agreement favoring donation of the 
pre-embryos for research;121 the court in A.Z. refused to enforce the 
prior agreement without both parties’ subsequent consent, favoring 
non-use of the pre-embryos;122 and the court in Litowitz chose to en-
force a prior agreement to discard the pre-embryos, even when both 
parties desired that the pre-embryos be implanted and develop.123  
 The potential threat to parties’ right to procreate is also evident in 
the balancing of interests model. For example, Davis makes conclu-
sions about the burdens that would be endured by each party if the 
right they were seeking to exercise was infringed, while maintaining 
that “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of 
equal significance—the right to procreate and the right to avoid pro-
creation.”124 The court sympathized with Junior Davis’s plight of not 
wanting to be a genetic father, even though its rationale for according 
more weight to Junior’s rights than Mary Sue’s was tenuous consid-
ering the intense IVF procedures that Mary Sue underwent.125 The 
                                                                                                                                       
 119. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 120. See id. at 515 (citing the recommendation by the American Medical Association 
that parties enter into prior agreements about the disposition of pre-embryos in the event 
of changes in circumstances, which would require parties to consider their desires and 
contemplate the consequences of the IVF process). 
 121. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 122. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 123. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 124. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). 
 125. Id. at 591. “We are not unmindful of the fact that the trauma (including both emo-
tional stress and physical discomfort) to which women are subjected in the IVF process is 
more severe than is the impact of the procedure on men.” Id. at 601. For Mary Sue, this 
process included numerous injections in spite of her fear of needles, aspiration procedures 
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court stated, “While this is not an insubstantial emotional burden, we 
can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis’s interest in donation is not 
as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding 
parenthood.”126 The court did not consider any personal reasons that 
Mary Sue might have had for desiring not to destroy the pre-
embryos. Moreover, the court assumed that Mary Sue should be 
equally as comfortable with adoption after she was able to create pre-
embryos of her own as she was before she was given the unique  
opportunity to exercise her procreative freedom.127 This case illus-
trates a clear risk that courts might arbitrarily balance interests to 
align with the more sympathetic party and decline to protect equiva-
lent constitutional rights equally.  
 Employing a uniform approach to resolve disputes would protect 
parties’ mutual interests, guarantee predictability of outcomes, pre-
serve parties’ fundamental rights, and prompt more careful consider-
ation in contracting before entering into IVF.  
B.   Lack of Uniformity of Status 
 In addition to a lack of uniformity among courts’ selection and  
application of dispute resolution models, there is no consensus re-
garding the legal status of pre-embryos. Even though Davis asserted 
that granting pre-embryos special respect was the most widely held 
view and the most appropriate view to adopt,128 this view has not 
been uniformly applied. Many courts do not analyze the independent 
status of the pre-embryo, while others operate as if it is property or  
a person. When the legal status of the pre-embryo is not uniformly 
defined, parties and providers are uncertain about which rights are 
implicated and which interests attach at the time a pre-embryo  
is created. This may lead to injury when parties feel that their expec-
tations are hindered or their rights are violated. To avoid such  
problems, there should be a uniform legal status for pre-embryos; 
however, there are disadvantages to characterizing pre-embryos as 
property or giving them special respect. 
 Under a property view, the potential for life of the pre-embryo is 
not considered, nor are the constitutional interests of the commis-
sioning couple in that life.129 When pre-embryos are considered  
property, essentially all that matters to resolve disputes is contract 
interpretation, enforceability of contracts, and marital property 
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law.130 These models could be very complicated because enforcement 
of a contract between parties could implicate procreation, even with-
out explicit recognition of the potential for life. Moreover, while mari-
tal property law might ease dispute resolution by dividing the pre-
embryos equally between both parties, it could equally violate one or 
more parties’ interests because a party could choose to utilize or  
destroy a pre-embryo, exercising a procreative liberty without con-
sent. Under a property view, parties would not be able to make an 
argument about infringement of their procreative freedom or about 
the potential for life.131 Furthermore, if pre-embryos are viewed as 
any other human tissue, it is impossible to limit the actions that can 
be taken, including methods of destruction, research, and experimen-
tation,132 thereby devaluing the life at issue.  
 Davis asserted that this potential for life converts the nature of 
the pre-embryo to a hybrid characterization as human tissue that 
should be accorded special respect.133 This status aims to promote 
greater respect for the pre-embryo than for other human tissue  
because of its “potential to become a person and because of its sym-
bolic meaning for many people.”134 It does not, however, accomplish 
this purpose in any practical manner because the status does not 
have the effect of granting any more respect to the pre-embryo. The 
resolution of most cases, even when this status is assumed, is still 
that the pre-embryo is destroyed. Reber and Szafranksi are the only 
cases to accord more respect to pre-embryos; yet the results in those 
cases had little to do with respect for the pre-embryos. In Reber and 
Szafranksi, the courts balanced the parties’ interests in favor of the 
women seeking to procreate because they did not have alternate 
means of exercising their procreative rights.135  
 Under Davis, the recognition of special respect was a means of es-
tablishing the parties’ fundamental privacy and procreative rights in 
relation to the pre-embryo, while leaving the status of the pre-embryo 
essentially the same. The special respect status triggers procreation 
interests, allowing parties to contract around disposition. It grants 
couples “an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that 
they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the 
preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law,” which is distinct 
from a true property interest.136 Yet, in applying the special respect 
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status and the interests vested by it, pre-embryos have actually been 
treated “more as property than as a person.”137  
 As evidenced by the cases employing property or special respect 
statuses, “courts have been unable to articulate a status for the  
embryo that provides for a workable solution to the dispute while 
simultaneously preserving respect for the unique attributes of the 
embryo.”138 For this reason, granting pre-embryos the legal status  
of persons might be the best approach to create a uniform status  
and establish an effective model for dispute resolution. Under the 
personhood approach, the party seeking procreation would nearly 
always receive custody of the pre-embryo,139 and the pre-embryo 
would be accorded legal rights. 
IV.   RESOLUTION 
 To solve the problems that arise in pre-embryo disputes, Florida 
should enact legislation to establish that a pre-embryo has the legal 
status of a person. This legal status would grant pre-embryos consti-
tutional protections, alter the decision-making authority of commis-
sioning couples, require regulation of IVF providers, and provide  
better guidance for courts in resolving disputes. Additionally, this 
status would solve the problems with pre-embryo disputes by provid-
ing predictability to the parties involved and helping them anticipate 
future responsibilities and potential liabilities before entering into 
IVF.  
A.   State’s Authority to Regulate 
 The starting point of this analysis is where the State derives its 
power to regulate in the area of assisted reproductive technology, and 
IVF more specifically. Before this question can be answered, the right 
to use IVF must be located within U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
 1.   State May Regulate Due Process and Equal Protection Rights 
 Many scholars assume that the right to use IVF flows from the 
fundamental right to procreate.140 The Supreme Court articulated the 
fundamental right to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma141 and placed 
that right within the privacy interest of an individual in Eisenstadt v. 
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Baird.142 In Eisenstadt the Court stated, “If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,  
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters  
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear  
or beget a child.”143 This precedent establishes that the government 
may intrude on the right to privacy by regulating IVF when it is  
warranted. Additionally, Eisenstadt may support the proposition that 
the right to use IVF does not fall within the scope of privacy rights. 
The right to privacy prohibits intrusion; thus government regulation 
intended to prevent access to certain technologies, without delving 
into personal matters, would not necessarily infringe on privacy.144  
 Under the view that there is no constitutional right to procreate 
using IVF, “the government [is] completely free to regulate the field 
of fertility treatments.”145 Radhika Rao has proposed the idea that 
there is no general right to utilize IVF, but any restriction must be 
equally applied to confer an equal right, in the absence of an absolute 
right.146 Therefore, “a law banning or limiting [IVF] would not neces-
sarily infringe the constitutional guarantee of equality.”147  
 2.   State Has Compelling Interest at Viability 
 If individuals have no constitutional right to use IVF, the State 
remains free to regulate and protect pre-embryos. However, even  
assuming that there is a fundamental right to procreate using IVF, 
the State may still have room to regulate. The relevant line of cases 
wherefrom a state derives the power to regulate IVF begins with Roe 
v. Wade.148 In Roe, the Supreme Court established that a fetus is not 
a constitutional person and should not be granted independent rights 
and protections as a person.149 Roe established a woman’s right to 
choose to have an abortion as falling under her fundamental right to 
privacy.150 In addition, Roe established that the State can regulate to 
advance its interest in potential life at viability.151 
 With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in 
potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so be-
cause the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful 
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life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of  
fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifi-
cations. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after via-
bility, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, 
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.152  
 Florida similarly recognizes that the constitutional right to priva-
cy protects a woman’s right to choose an abortion;153 but a compelling 
interest in protecting potential life attaches at the point of viability  
of the fetus.154 Therefore, “[l]egislation that infringes on the right to 
privacy will be invalidated unless it can survive the compelling state 
interest test.”155  
 Davis applied the privacy rights accorded by Roe—and corre-
spondingly by Florida—to the IVF context. Davis declared that there 
is no constitutional basis for considering the pre-embryo as a person 
because the “Supreme Court explicitly refused to hold that the fetus 
possesses independent rights under law.”156 However, the court noted 
that Roe and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services confirm a  
compelling state interest in potential life at the point of viability157—
when the fetus is capable of meaningful life outside the mother’s 
womb.158 Notably, the point of viability in abortion cases is distinct 
from viability in the IVF context. In IVF, a pre-embryo is inherently 
capable of meaningful life outside its mother’s womb because it is 
created outside the mother’s womb and has the potential to fully  
develop outside of the mother’s womb if implanted in another  
woman’s body. The argument for viability in IVF, then, is different 
than the understanding in the Roe line of cases, where viability was 
                                                                                                                                       
 152. Id.  
 153. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So. 2d 1036, 1041  
(Fla. 2001). 
 154. See Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“The state’s interest 
in the potentiality of life of an unborn fetus becomes compelling,” so as to potentially over-
come the mother’s constitutional right to refuse medical intervention, “ ‘at the point in time 
when the fetus becomes viable,’ defined as ‘the time at which the fetus becomes capable of 
meaningful life outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid.’ ” (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 
2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989))); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192-93 (holding that the 
State’s interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester so 
as to overcome women’s privacy interests in abortion).   
 155. Thomas v. Smith, 882 So. 2d 1037, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Von Eiff v. 
Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998) (“When analyzing a statute that infringes on the 
fundamental right of privacy, the applicable standard of review requires that the statute 
survive the highest level of scrutiny,” under which the State bears the burden of “demon-
strating that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes 
its goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”).  
 156. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). 
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inextricably linked to the biological mother’s body. This difference 
provides a basis for the State to regulate as of the time a pre-embryo 
is created. 
 The decision in Roe rested heavily on infringement of a woman’s 
bodily integrity and the burdens of unwanted motherhood.159 In  
the same vein, Roe’s progeny considered how the development of  
a life would affect the mother and possibly infringe on her reproduc-
tive freedom and bodily integrity. However, IVF presents concerns  
distinct from the bodily integrity argument in Roe and the cases  
that followed.160 With IVF, the mother’s bodily integrity is not neces-
sarily implicated by the process after the pre-embryo has been  
created. A woman may decide not to go through with implantation 
and donate the pre-embryo to a third party, relinquishing any  
undesired parental status by allowing for adoption. Therefore, the 
State’s compelling interest in the potential life of pre-embryos  
attaches at the time of fertilization in the laboratory, which signals 
their viability.  
 3.   Pre-Embryo Protection Is Consistent with Other Fetal  
Protections  
 Recognizing that the State has a compelling interest in protecting 
a pre-embryo as of the time of fertilization is consistent with Florida’s 
recognition of greater fetal protections in other areas of the law.  
For example, Florida grants protection in its fetal homicide laws, 
providing that the “unlawful killing of an unborn child . . . shall be 
deemed murder.”161 Section 1.01(3), Florida Statutes, provides: “The 
word ‘person’ includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint 
adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, 
fiduciaries, corporations, and all other groups or combinations.”162 
The use of the term “children” in the murder statute connotes a sta-
tus of personhood that extends to fetuses in this context; the statute 
makes no indication that the term is intended to apply only to fetuses 
after the point of gestational viability.163 Therefore, Florida’s fetal 
homicide law recognizes that the State has a compelling interest in 
potential life, which gives the State authority to regulate before the 
point of gestational viability.  
                                                                                                                                       
 159. See id. at 153. 
 160. See Rao, supra note 105, at 1467-68. 
 161. FLA. STAT. § 782.09(1) (2015).  
 162. § 1.01(3) (emphasis added).  
 163. Gestational viability refers to the viability of a fetus in the mother’s womb. This is 
a distinct concept from viability of a pre-embryo, which I argue, begins at fertilization be-
cause of the pre-embryo’s potential for full development outside of the biological  
mother’s womb.  
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 Florida identifies varying degrees of protection for potential life, 
which allows it to assert personhood in the context of fetal homicide 
laws without compromising abortion rights. Similarly, the court in 
Davis recognized that potential life may receive varying degrees of 
protection. The court noted that while a viable fetus is not accorded 
protection against wrongful death, it is awarded some protection in 
the abortion context unless the mother’s life is at risk and greater 
protection in a criminal context involving attack or homicide.164 It is 
clear from such protections that Florida has an important interest in 
protecting human life, which becomes a compelling interest in certain 
contexts, like fetal homicide laws, and should become compelling in 
the IVF context. The State’s interest in fetal personhood in criminal 
laws creates room to carve out pre-embryo personhood that does not 
contradict the State’s position on abortion.  
 The State has authority to regulate IVF, even under various  
understandings of the right to procreate. Under the position that 
there is no fundamental right to assisted reproduction and that IVF 
does not constitute government intrusion into a person’s body,  
the State may regulate IVF freely. Under the notion that there is a 
fundamental right to procreate using IVF, the State’s interest must 
be compelling in order to justify infringement. The reason the State’s 
interest is compelling in IVF is because of the nuanced understand-
ing of viability in this context, which occurs at the time of fertiliza-
tion in the laboratory. From this point, the State may regulate IVF in 
the interest of protecting human life.  
B.   Legislative Proposal and Implications 
 Florida should utilize its authority to regulate in the field of  
IVF and create a law that grants pre-embryos the legal status of  
persons, similar to the Louisiana statute that identifies pre-embryos 
as human beings.165 This law would complement Florida’s current 
legislation mandating that couples enter into an agreement with the 
physician prior to commencing IVF treatment;166 however, it would 
alter this agreement in several respects. First, all agreements would 
have a clause recognizing the status of pre-embryos as persons and 
explicitly implicating the right to procreate.167 Second, agreements 
would mimic the laws of Germany and Italy, providing that a maxi-
                                                                                                                                       
 164. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-95 (Tenn. 1992). 
 165. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2015) (defining “human embryo”). 
 166. See FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2015); see also discussion supra Section II.C. 
 167. There is discord among courts as to when the right to procreate is implicated. One 
view acknowledges that the right to procreate attaches at the point when the parties agree 
to fertilize the egg and create the pre-embryo; the opposing view sees the right to procreate 
as an ongoing choice initially implicated by the creation of the pre-embryo. Upchurch, su-
pra note 3, at 408-09. 
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mum of three pre-embryos be fertilized at one time and requiring  
implantation of all fertilized pre-embryos at the same time. Third, 
the agreement would preclude the destruction of pre-embryos and 
only allow cryogenic preservation in exceptional circumstances.  
Finally, since section 742.17, Florida Statutes, does not provide guid-
ance as to the enforceability of this agreement between parties, new 
legislation would ensure enforcement of prior agreements between 
the parties. 
 The American Medical Association (AMA) recommends that  
parties engage in serious discussions and consider all consequences 
before undergoing IVF.168 Heeding this caution, couples commencing 
IVF treatment should regard this process very seriously and only  
enter into it with full willingness to become a parent. The clause 
identifying the pre-embryos as persons would cause the right to pro-
create to attach at the point that the parties agree to create any pre-
embryos. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society 
suggests that “[a] person’s liberty to procreate or to avoid procreation 
is directly involved in most decisions involving pre-embryos.”169 The 
agreement between the parties and with the physician is the first 
decision involving pre-embryos. The action of providing genetic mate-
rial pursuant to this agreement, with the intention that childbirth 
will result, is a direct exercise of an individual’s procreative liberty. 
Beyond this point, there should be no question of the donor’s liberty 
to exercise their procreative rights because of the manifest intent  
to procreate with knowledge that the procedures will likely result in 
conception and the birth of a child. This intent and knowledge would 
be sufficient to establish parental rights at the time the parties  
enter into the agreement. To this effect, proceeding with treatment 
would seriously limit the possible outcomes for a couple that later 
changes their mind regarding disposition. Because parties can waive 
constitutional rights via contract,170 entering into the IVF agreement 
would preclude parties from later asserting a right not to procreate 
with regard to the disposition of any pre-embryos they created.  
 The limitation on the number of pre-embryos produced, the re-
quirement of implantation, and the prohibition of cryogenic preserva-
tion would significantly speed up the IVF process. It would render 
IVF off limits to couples seeking to preserve pre-embryos for poten-
tial future use and postponement of reproduction, except in cases 
where imminent physical conditions would render someone infertile, 
as in Reber and Szafranski.171 These regulations would close the  
                                                                                                                                       
 168. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).  
 169. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 170. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 516. 
 171. Id. at 515; Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
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window for couples’ circumstances, values, and desires to change  
regarding the outcome of the IVF process and future disposition of 
pre-embryos. Inevitably, disputes would arise in some cases, which 
would lead courts to enforce contracts. The limitations on the crea-
tion and preservation of pre-embryos in this proposed legislation 
would require that disposition be limited to implantation by the 
commissioning couple or donation to an adoptive couple. Courts 
would be able to enforce contracts that satisfy either option chosen by 
the couple without balancing the interests and without contempora-
neous mutual consent. 
 The AMA and courts have encouraged parties to make agreements 
about the disposition of frozen pre-embryos in the event of contingen-
cies.172 Florida law establishes this as a requirement.173 A contractual 
approach is beneficial both at the outset of the IVF process to memo-
rialize the agreed intentions of the parties and at the dispute resolu-
tion phase to remove the court from making personal decisions for 
the parties.174 Furthermore, it gives couples and IVF providers the 
certainty lacking in current dispute resolution models.  
 To answer the court’s question in Witten,175 under this legislation, 
the parties’ mutual agreement at the time of contracting for IVF 
would be given greater deference than contemporaneous mutual  
consent—which, if achieved, would rarely give rise to litigation in the 
first place. Weighing consent at the time that parties agree to use 
IVF and contribute their genetic material for fertilization would pro-
vide the advantages of: 1) binding the parties to previous obligations 
despite changes in priorities or values; 2) guaranteeing that the  
outcome represents a meeting of the minds between the parties176—
possibly the only agreement between the parties throughout the 
course of the process and subsequent dispute; and 3) ensuring that 
this personal decision is one made by the parties, not a far-removed 
court.  
 This framework would lead to different outcomes than the  
current trend, not solely because of the certainty that prior agree-
ments would be enforced, but because of additional considerations  
in a balancing of interests approach. Following Davis, courts have 
found a way to nearly always side with the party avoiding procrea-
tion. The interests, however, would look different under this proposed 
legislation because the right to procreate would already be exercised, 
                                                                                                                                       
 172. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506, 515. 
 173. FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2015).  
 174. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506.  
 175. “[A]t what time does the partners’ consent matter?” In re Marriage of Witten, 672 
N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003). 
 176. Although, there has been concern over coercion and potential undue influence 
because of the close relation of the parties. 
2015]  PERSONHOOD FOR PRE-EMBRYOS 341 
 
and the State would have an interest in protecting pre-embryos.  
Additionally, a pre-embryo’s right to life may arise in the analysis if 
the court decided to balance all the parties’ interests or if the court 
employed the best interest of the child standard.177  
 One additional consideration regarding contract enforcement is 
that contracts should be enforced unless they violate public policy.178 
The court in Witten considered whether public policy favored the  
position that a party who agrees to enter into IVF may not later 
change his or her mind to become a parent.179 The court pointed out 
that there was no state statute on point, but the “morals of the  
times”—based on precedent of other state courts that considered the 
issue—weighed in favor of the party avoiding procreation.180 The 
court, therefore, determined that there was no public policy to favor 
using the pre-embryos over either party’s objection.181 
 Conversely, in Florida, there is an existing statute requiring  
couples to enter into an agreement prior to commencing IVF. This 
mandatory contracting furthers public policy and promotes estab-
lished societal interests. In addition, there is no federal or Florida 
precedent that would be violated by recognition of personhood  
for pre-embryos or regulation of IVF. Florida’s compelling interest  
in protecting human life at the point of viability supports the  
proposition that the “morals of the times” call for legislation that 
promotes life. In regard to the proposed framework, public policy 
supports enforcing agreements and maintaining the legal status of 
pre-embryos as persons.  
V.   DEFENDING THE PROPOSITION 
 There are several notable objections to address in defense of this 
proposal. Initially, critics might point out that recognition of person-
hood of a pre-embryo violates long-standing precedent established 
with Roe and subsequent cases. As Part IV explains, recognition of 
personhood may be reconciled with Roe because IVF arises outside of 
                                                                                                                                       
 177. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (2015); see also discussion supra Section II.C. 
 178. See Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779-80 (“The term ‘public policy’ is of indefinite and 
uncertain definition, and there is no absolute rule or test by which it can be always deter-
mined whether a contract contravenes the public policy of the state; but each case must be 
determined according to the terms of the instrument under consideration and the circum-
stances peculiar thereto. In general, however, it may be said that any contract which con-
flicts with the morals of the times or contravenes any established interest of society is con-
trary to public policy. We must look to the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions of 
the state, to determine its public policy and that which is not prohibited by statute, con-
demned by judicial decision, nor contrary to the public morals contravenes no principle of 
public policy.” (quoting Liggett v. Shriver, 164 N.W. 611, 612-13 (Iowa 1917))). 
 179. Id. at 780. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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the privacy context of bodily integrity. Additionally, some may argue 
that regulating the decision-making authority of parents would  
constitute government intrusion into privacy rights given that  
parenting and family matters are subsumed in the fundamental right 
to privacy.182 However, the Fertility Society stated that the gamete 
providers should have the ultimate authority to make decisions  
regarding pre-embryos “in the absence of specific legislation.”183  
Accordingly, where there is legislation, such as that proposed here, it 
is reasonable that parents’ decision-making authority may be regu-
lated. Moreover, a state may justifiably impact procreative autonomy 
through a public policy statement that describes the need for action.  
 Another objection may be that this status would hinder IVF 
treatment. Davis, for example, makes several sweeping statements 
that recognition of pre-embryos as persons would “doubtless” have 
the effect of outlawing IVF programs in Tennessee,184 and that under 
this view, an agreement about disposition would “obviously” be  
unenforceable in the event of disagreement.185 This Note rejects the 
Davis court’s assertions. IVF would not be outlawed, or rendered  
obsolete, because this treatment would still provide a fruitful means 
of procreation for people even without allowing for freezing, destruc-
tion, or donation to research. Storing, destroying, or researching  
pre-embryos does not further the purpose of IVF because these  
actions do not lead to the creation of a child; therefore, eliminating 
them would not frustrate IVF treatment. Moreover, this legislation 
would promote advances in IVF technology to find more effective 
means of achieving successful pregnancy and childbirth without  
long-term preservation of pre-embryos. Furthermore, an agreement 
between parties would still be enforceable so long as the language in 
the agreement was restricted to implantation in one of the parties or 
an adoptive parent. 
 Yet another possible objection is that limiting the number of  
pre-embryos created may increase costs and decrease the likelihood 
of resulting pregnancy, burdening the right to procreate. The right to 
procreate, however, would not be infringed by equally applied regula-
tion because no one seeking to procreate would be automatically  
prevented from exercising this right. Regulation would instead pro-
                                                                                                                                       
 182. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 335 (Fla. 2013) (holding that a person’s fun-
damental liberty interest in parenting is specifically protected by the state constitution’s 
privacy provision); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115 (Fla. 2004) (holding that there is a 
constitutionally protected interest in preserving the family and raising one’s children). 
 183. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); see also Roman v. Roman, 193 
S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that parties may mutually agree on disposition 
of frozen, stored pre-embryos before entering into IVF).  
 184. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595. 
 185. Id. at 597. 
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mote the right to procreate because having a child, the only intended 
result of the IVF process, would be the only outcome possible in  
the event of successful treatment. Couples seeking solely to postpone 
reproduction would be limited to freezing eggs and sperm separately. 
While this may be less successful to treat infertility, there is no  
fundamental right to postpone reproduction; such regulation would 
not be a violation of an individual’s right to procreate, but a limita-
tion on the specific means of procreation.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 This Note presents a framework for IVF regulation that Florida, 
or any state, may adopt to prevent disputes about the disposition of 
pre-embryos and resolve disputes that inevitably arise, while promot-
ing respect for human life. If the proposed legislation were adopted, 
other areas of IVF would need to be considered that are beyond the 
scope of this Note. One example is the question of how to deal with 
potentially millions of frozen, stored pre-embryos if they were to be 
considered human beings.186  
 This Note advocates that public policy is served by recognition  
of personhood for pre-embryos and that Florida has a compelling  
interest in protecting potential life that extends to pre-embryos  
in the IVF context by virtue of their viability. In addition to this  
interest, Florida should consider that establishing the legal status of 
pre-embryos would prevent courts from choosing among outcome-
determinative approaches that involve balancing individual’s equal 
rights in seeking procreation and avoiding procreation. Additionally, 
this personhood model would clarify IVF providers’ and progenitors’ 
rights with regard to pre-embryos and encourage couples to antici-
pate near-certain parenthood resulting from the IVF process. This is 
consistent with the purpose of IVF, as people seeking treatment do so 
solely with the intention of creating a child. Accordingly, Florida 
should enact legislation to establish the legal status of pre-embryos 
as persons to promote continuity in IVF and protect life.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 186. See Lewin, supra note 114 (noting that there are perhaps a million frozen pre-
embryos currently stored in the United States). 
